University of Louisville

ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository
College of Arts & Sciences Senior Honors
Theses

College of Arts & Sciences

5-2020

Race relations during the 1937 flood: confronting polite racism,
identity, and collective memory in Louisville.
Elizabeth J. Standridge
University of Louisville

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/honors
Part of the Social History Commons

Recommended Citation
Standridge, Elizabeth J., "Race relations during the 1937 flood: confronting polite racism, identity, and
collective memory in Louisville." (2020). College of Arts & Sciences Senior Honors Theses. Paper 233.
Retrieved from https://ir.library.louisville.edu/honors/233

This Senior Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts & Sciences at ThinkIR:
The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Arts &
Sciences Senior Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's
Institutional Repository. This title appears here courtesy of the author, who has retained all other copyrights. For
more information, please contact thinkir@louisville.edu.

Race Relations During the 1937 Flood: Confronting Polite Racism, Identity, and
Collective Memory in Louisville

By
Elizabeth J. Standridge

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for Graduation Summa Cum Laude
University of Louisville
March 2020

Standridge 1
Table of Contents
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………2
Introduction and Historiography.………………………………………………………………….3
Race Relations in Louisville………………………………………………………………………6
Events of the Flood………………………………………………………………………………..9
Race and the Flood……………………………………………………………………………….14
Flood Coverage in African American Newspapers: Debating Louisville’s Response………..…22
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….29
Endnotes………………………………………………………………………………………….32

Standridge 2
Abstract
This thesis focuses on race relations during the 1937 in Louisville. The dominant
narrative of the 1937 flood in Louisville is that the city united while facing mutual adversity and
rebuilding the city. In this story, the waters of the flood washed away any social or racial
distinctions, rendering everyone equal during the crisis. Despite this popular narrative, the reality
of race relations during the flood was much more complicated. Louisville’s race relations from
the nineteenth century until well into the twentieth century have been described by historian
George C. Wright as “polite racism.” This complex and unequal relationship between whites and
African Americans persisted throughout the flood. This thesis examines the popular memory of
the flood and challenges it by focusing on the experiences of African Americans during the
event.

Lay summary
The narrative of the 1937 flood in Louisville is that the city united during the crisis and
everyone, regardless of race or class, was treated equally. Despite this popular narrative, the
reality of race relations during the flood was much more complicated. Louisville’s complex and
unequal relationship between whites and African Americans persisted throughout the flood. This
thesis examines the popular narrative of the flood and challenges it by focusing on race relations
during the event.

Key Words
Louisville, Kentucky; 1937 flood; race relations; collective memory
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The 1937 flood is one of the most iconic events in Louisville’s history. Photographs of
houses inundated to the roof and boats floating between downtown buildings are visually
stunning, while stories of bravery and camaraderie are equally captivating. The popular memory
of the flood more than eighty years following its occurrence is that of the community coming
together to pull itself out of disaster and build a better Louisville. This narrative emerged shortly
after the flood and has been passed down to later generations, persisting virtually unchecked for
decades. Paradoxically, despite this rosy representation of the event, one photograph taken
during the flood that has become one of the most recognizable images of the twentieth century
hints at a different story. Life magazine staff photographer Margaret Bourke-White took the
photo known as “The American Way” while on assignment in Louisville during the flood. In the
picture, a breadline populated only by African Americans waits for aid in front of a billboard
proclaiming the “World’s Highest Standard of Living,” with an image of a white family and their
dog driving joyously in a car. Beside them is the slogan “There’s no way like the American
way!”1 The visual irony in the image reflects the tension between the collective memory of the
flood in Louisville, and the fact of racial discrimination captured by the famous photo of the
event. There has been little scholarship attempting to reconcile that tension.
Examining race relations during the flood challenges the collective memory of the event
– that is, the story that Louisvillians have constructed to fit their understandings of themselves
and their community. Specifically, the African American experience during the 1937 flood and
how it was perceived and negotiated at the time, illustrate the character of race relations in
Louisville that have been described by scholar George C. Wright as "polite racism.”2 In a time of
crisis, Louisville included African Americans fleeing rising waters in rescue efforts – a point of
pride for Louisvillians who often portrayed their city as having superior race relations as
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compared to other southern cities. However, disagreement on how well blacks were served, the
undercurrent of classist and racist judgement that accompanied aid, and defensiveness with
which the flood response has been remembered, indicate tensions in the city over the place of
African Americans in it.
Scholars writing about 1937 flood throughout the Ohio-Mississippi Valley flood have
done tremendous archival research and outlined the events of the disaster day-by-day. However,
their work often adheres strongly to the dominant collective memory of the flood and rarely
mentions African Americans. Those books that do include the experiences of black Louisvillians
often do so as a side note without extensive discussion. The result is a very limited and at times
conflicting understanding of race relations during the flood.
In his book, The Thousand-Year Flood: The Ohio-Mississippi Disaster of 1937, David
Welky considers the entirety of the region affected, rather than Louisville specifically, providing
a brief, but insightful analysis of race relations during the flood. In his estimation, following the
blatant, unchecked racism within relief efforts during the 1927 Mississippi flood, black leaders
during the 1937 flood were relieved that “abuses were localized rather than systemic” and chose
to focus on improvements in race relations during relief, rather than shortcomings.3 While this
may be true overall, Louisvillians had no firsthand memory of the 1927 flood as it primarily
affected the Lower Mississippi River; therefore, his argument is not entirely applicable to the
city in particular. Moreover, given the nature of race relations in Louisville, it is unlikely that
Louisvillians ever would have thought such overt and egregious racism possible in their city.
Rick Bell’s The Great Flood of 1937: Rising Waters, Soaring Spirits on the other hand,
focuses on Louisville specifically. Yet, Bell often glosses over race relations and repeats the
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popular narrative that the flood acted as a social equalizer while bringing the community together
in pursuit of a common goal. The author states:
People were cared for, no matter their race or creed. On many occasions, people of both
races were brought together by circumstances and inter-racial friendships began. For a
period of time, the Great Flood served as a great social leveler as everyone was the same
color – muddy; everyone felt the same emotion – fear; and everyone shared the same
dream – a return to normalcy.4
This optimistic rendering of events is undoubtedly a simplification of reality. Similarly, Two
Centuries of Black Louisville asserts that city officials abandoned the idea of segregating by race
during relief efforts following protests from black leaders.5 This statement unfortunately leaves
out the nuance of the situation.
Primary sources created by black individuals are of course necessary to document how
race fit into relief efforts, yet the virtual exclusion of minority voices from mainstream archives
until the 1960s complicates this endeavor. One source of African American eyewitness
testimony is the 1939 thesis, “The Louisville Flood of 1937 with Special Reference to the Negro
Population” written by Alberta Mae Calloway, an African American woman. Dr. Charles H.
Parrish Jr., then a professor at the Louisville Municipal College, assisted Calloway in collecting
eyewitness testimony by distributing a questionnaire to twenty friends and students in January
1939.6 The original questionnaires are lost, but Calloway included several stories which
illuminate the experiences of African Americans during the flood. These stories must be
considered with caution as they have been selected and edited for specific use within the
dissertation. However, in combination with other sources these stories shed some light on the
subject.
As with any primary source, issues of memory, subjectivity and intent must always be
considered. Whether written or oral, no source is value neutral. Additionally, memory is
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incredibly malleable and is “influenced by what happens to a person after the event as well as by
receiving new information that can cause people to reconstruct their memories.”7 The very act of
remembering transforms the memory itself. Questionnaires completed two years following the
flood and oral histories taped forty years later, such as Dathon and Oma Jones’ oral history
interview which mentioned race during 1937 flood, are both affected by the passage of time,
precariousness of memory, and prevailing collective memories. Witnesses should be respected,
but sources should be considered with critical distance. These sources, particularly oral histories,
are valuable for establishing collective memory and for identifying cracks in the popular
narrative when interpreted critically. For example, in Oma and Dathon Jones’ interview the
couple begin by essentially repeating the collective memory, but when questioned on further
details of their experiences during flood it becomes clear that the reality of situation was more
complex.
Finally, attempting to create a holistic picture of race during the 1937 flood requires
recognition of the diversity within Louisville’s black community. There is no singular African
American experience, as race intersects with gender, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status
and other such identity factors. Though natural disasters are generally painted as temporary
social equalizers, that is not necessarily true in terms of race, nor should it be assumed for any
other social distinctions. Each perspective is important, but it is equally important to recognize
its potential limitations. Calloway’s writing for example considers testimony gathered from
African Americans who have the means to seek a college education, which in 1937 would have
been a limited portion of the population.
Race Relations in Louisville
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In 1930, Louisville was home to approximately 300,000 people of whom 47,000 were
African American, constituting close to fifteen percent of population.8 Although small enclaves
could be found in several neighborhoods, the majority of African Americans lived in four areas:
downtown, California, Smoketown, and a portion of the Parkland neighborhood known as “Little
Africa.”9 In these areas, African Americans often lived in substandard and overcrowded
conditions with population densities twice those of white neighborhoods.10 According to one
scholar, despite this limitation most Louisvillians, white and black, viewed their city’s race
relations as fairly progressive citing African American voter participation and such events as the
1870-1871 protests that resulted in the integration of public transportation as evidence.11
According to scholar and author George C. Wright, an atmosphere of “polite racism”
persisted in the city from 1865 until well into the twentieth century. In this system, whites
remained firmly at the top of society and African Americans were stuck as second-class citizens.
Although African Americans and a small group of white allies did make some progress in race
relations, other powerful whites adopted a more paternalistic approach, choosing very selectively
what measures of advancement to support.12 In this way, power holding whites positioned
themselves as “friends of the Negro” and supported minimal improvements in black lives, but
opposed “anything that would drastically improve overall conditions for blacks or put them on
equal footing with whites.”13 This veneer allowed many whites a false notion of their own
progressivism, despite the fact that African Americans were far more responsible for their own
advancement than whites would like to admit.14 Still, this delusion extended to whites as well as
some African Americans. As Wright states:
This polite racism often deluded both blacks and well-meaning whites into believing that
real progress was being made in their city. This politeness allowed local whites to say
that they were different from other whites – fairer in dealing with blacks – and yet it
served to warn blacks that they should be appreciative of the treatment they received.
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This attitude led black leaders, though by no means all of them, to accept racial
indignities for fear that upsetting the status quo might result in a much harsher racial
order.15
As a result of the combined factors of “the absence of race riots and lynchings, blacks
maintaining their franchise, and whites calling for the uplift of Afro-Americans,” (whether
genuine or not) many white and some black Louisvillians and travelers to the city believed that
African Americans in Louisville were treated far better than in the deep South.16 For example,
although lynchings and race riots occurred throughout the north and south, Louisville was free of
such racial violence for the entire period of 1865-1930.17 In addition, in the 1890s African
Americans in Louisville received political recognition for the first time. As Wright states “Just
keeping the right to vote was an accomplishment, considering the success of the
disenfranchisement movements in several states bordering Kentucky.”18 Both the absence of
racial violence, and black voter participation in Louisville along with several other factors, led
Louisvillians to believe that their city had superior race relations relative to other communities.
Although many Louisvillians saw evidence for positive race relations in their city, that
was not always true. Even though there was less racial violence than in the Deep South, the same
racially stratified structure persisted with whites at the top and blacks firmly at the bottom.
Although Louisville’s residential segregation ordinance was overturned in the 1917 Supreme
Court case Buchanan v. Warley, the decision did not result in integrated neighborhoods and
African Americans faced violence should they attempt to defy the residential boundaries that
whites created.19 In the 1930s, African Americans were still barred from many skilled
occupations and overrepresented as common laborers and domestic workers. In addition,
educational opportunities remained few and far between and schools were segregated and
unequal at all grade levels.20 In Louisville, public spaces were “constantly being infused and
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reinfused with meaning by both blacks and whites” creating a city of invisible social
boundaries.21 African Americans were unwelcome in many businesses, and learned to avoid
racial barriers and potential trouble. In addition, despite the racism and barriers they encountered,
African Americans were expected to be grateful for their treatment as conditions could be worse.
Should African Americans challenge the status quo, their actions might well be met with harsh
backlash.22
As an urban area in the northernmost portion of a border state, the self- proclaimed
“Gateway to the South” occupied a regionally ambiguous position. At different times,
Louisvillians invoked regional codes to either challenge or affirm the city’s state of race
relations.23 For example, in general for many people the Deep South represented extremely poor
race relations and stringent segregation, while the north conveyed a more progressive image,
despite reality not being nearly as simple. By rhetorically positioning the city as the leading city
in the South for race relations, white Louisvillians were lulled into feeling that the state of
progress had been sufficient, yet when compared to northern cities Louisville did not stand up so
favorably.24
Events of the Flood
The cause of the flood of 1937 is relatively straightforward: record rainfall in January
1937 to the tune of 165 billion tons of precipitation inundated and overwhelmed the Ohio and
Mississippi Rivers and connective tributaries. Flooding in some capacity affected one hundred
ninety-six counties in twelve states spanning from West Virginia to Louisiana, with the hardest
hit portions in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Kentucky. River cities such as Cincinnati, Ohio, Cairo,
Illinois, and Jeffersonville, Indiana, were flooded with Louisville receiving the brunt of the
flood’s force.25
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As river city residents, Louisvillians were used to flooding; notable floods occurred
regularly with particularly memorable events in 1884, 1907, 1913, and 1933. Many residents
assumed the flood of 1884’s record 46.7 foot high water mark was the highest the river would
ever reach. Confidence in this belief took physical form in the critical infrastructure of power
plants and water pumping stations located at the forty-seven foot flood mark, just barely above
the record high.26 Additionally, Louisvillians were assured by such strong false confidence that
even as waters rose in 1937 many people resisted warnings to evacuate, maintaining the position
that the water had never reached them before and would not this time either. Their false
confidence forced rescue crews to return on multiple occasions to pick up stragglers as they
finally gave up and admitted danger.27
Such was the jaded atmosphere in Louisville, that as the river passed the flood stage of 28
feet on January 16, 1937, it did not cause much concern. In fact, it was not even front-page
news.28 Although those living in the lowlands near the river in such areas as the Point and
Shippingport evacuated as early as January 16, most Louisvillians remained unconcerned with
the flooding. But nothing could have prepared the city for the incredible 19.17 inches of rain that
would fall during January 1937 alone.29As rain and sleet fell and the river continued to rise, it
slowly became apparent that this was no ordinary flood. Conditions escalated quickly, worsening
dramatically each day; on January 21 the river was at thirty-nine feet. By the next day the river
had risen six and a half feet to surpass the previous high-water mark from the 1884 flood.30
With growing urgency, citizens and civil servants hastily undertook evacuations to higher
ground downtown and in the city’s eastern portions.31 On January 22, the Courier-Journal,
Louisville’s main daily newspaper, carried a headline that underscored the mounting severity of
the situation, and warned that electricity could be cut in the city if the river reached forty-seven
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feet.32 The following day as the situation continued to escalate, Mayor Neville Miller ordered oil
stations closed to preserve resources for rescue and relief, while Dr. Hugh Leavell, Director of
Health, urged all citizens above the age of two to receive vaccinations for typhoid fever.33 The
local radio station WHAS Radio halted regular programming to disseminate information,
relaying calls for boats, supplies, and public health and safety information to the public. In
general, the radio was paramount for coordinating relief efforts especially in the first days of the
flood, but also served the purpose of keeping the populace informed of the situation and
providing a shred of stability.34
On January 24, 1937, or “Black Sunday,” the full severity of the flood became clear.
Forty percent of the city’s area was underwater, and everyone west of Fifteenth Street was
ordered to evacuate.35 After a losing battle against rising waters, the Louisville Gas and Electric
Company’s western substation, Canal Station, and Riverside Substation all failed, leaving the
city in the dark.36 Later that same night WHAS Radio went quiet for the first time during the
disaster – the result of a power outage. Within two hours the station regained the airwaves, and
by then the extent of the flood was clear to even the most skeptical river city residents.37
On January 26, Kentucky Governor Albert “Happy” Chandler declared martial law in
Louisville upon Mayor Miller’s request, and appointed Miller as acting Provost Marshall.38
With this title Miller gained the authority to direct federal soldiers, members of the Coast Guard
and U.S. Navy personnel, into Louisville to help aid in evacuations, discourage looting, and keep
the peace.39 In addition to these federal reinforcements, hundreds of police officers from various
states traveled to Louisville to aid in many of the same capacities.40 Miller appointed a hierarchy
of civilian emergency committees and subcommittees which coordinated relief efforts and
attempted to bring some order to the chaotic city.41 The mayor pacified fears that the army was

Standridge 12
taking over entirely as implied by the declaration of martial law. He spoke to citizens via the
radio to assure residents that federal force offered trained reinforcements, but that the city was
still being run by civilians.42
Throughout the disaster, quickly changing flood conditions necessitated a rapid and
dynamic response. The peril of rising water threatened Louisvillians not only from the river
front, but also from the overwhelmed sewer system. Water from backed up drains flooded
basements and streets, at times reportedly consuming street curbs, and swallowing signs within
hours. Thousands of Louisvillians’ homes were flooded, requiring the occupants to be rescued by
crews of civil servants and volunteers manning trucks supplied by the city Sanitation Department
before relying more heavily on boats, both commandeered and loaned to the city.43 On January
27, the river finally reached its crest at 57.15 feet- over ten feet higher than the previous record.44
Over the next few days, water levels slowly lowered, and some normal functions of the city
began to be restored, but property damage was extensive and many Louisvillians would remain
displaced for weeks or months afterwards.
During the flood thousands of displaced Louisvillians required temporary shelter, food,
and other aid, while near freezing temperatures and contaminated food and water threatened to
cause disease and death. Citizens were housed locally wherever possible including makeshift
refugee stations, private homes, and tent cities, and were also carried by train to unaffected cities
throughout the state. At first refugees from the city’s most extensively affected portion, the West
End, were brought to higher ground downtown until still rising waters and overcrowding
necessitated further movement into eastern portions of the city in neighborhoods such as the
Highlands and Crescent Hill. Schools, churches, community centers, and businesses all became
temporary refugee centers and operated with the aid of the local government, military, American
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Red Cross, Salvation Army, Volunteers of America, and Works Progress Administration
(WPA).45 Nurses and doctors moved quickly among stations to administer first aid and vaccinate
the population against typhoid fever – an utmost concern due to potentially contaminated water.
Circumstances among relief stations varied sometimes drastically from place to place due
to changing flood conditions and the breakdown of communication. Some refugee centers only
provided temporary shelter until refugees could be moved along to more suitable locations or
return home, while others housed refugees for several weeks. One example of a location that
operated in both capacities was the Presbyterian Colored Community Center. In a report dated
February 16, 1937, John Little, superintendent of the organization, described the mission’s role
in the flood as a “transient relief station” that housed some for as little as a week until waters
receded enough for them to return to their dwellings, while others whose homes required more
extensive repairs remained for over five weeks.46
Individuals often described their immediate experience during the flood in terms of
adversity and astonishment, but the city-wide memory that rapidly developed was one of unity,
perseverance, and progression forward. As waters began to recede, this memory was first
articulated by Mayor Miller, who spoke of Louisvillians working together during the disaster and
urged them to continue doing so while rebuilding. In a statement directed to the entirety of the
city from the Mayor’s Committee on Morale, Miller stated:
By working together – white and black, Jew and gentile, Catholic and Protestant, we have
been working together. We must keep it up. Let us realize that we are truly fellow
workers with God as well as with one another. We will build a better and greater
Louisville – a city is not built of brick and mortar, not of wood and stone alone; it is built
of men who inhabit it. Louisville must have better homes, better churches, better schools,
better courts, better streets, better sewers, better bridges, a better social, industrial,
political, and religious life. For all these we need better men and women. It is our work to
build and rebuild all this.47
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Unity, cooperation, and optimism, as expressed by Miller, became pervasive themes in the
collective memory of the event. Moreover, many community leaders and citizens echoed Miller
in seeing the flood as a social equalizer
Race and the Flood
The flood left an indelible mark in Louisvillians’ memories, prompting citizens to record
their experiences and scholars to study the event. The result are many sources that either
explicitly or not, illuminate race relations during the flood. One year after the event, University
of Louisville sociology professor Robert I. Kutak observed that the flood removed Louisvillians
from their usual private cells and thrust them into an unfamiliar collective, forcing them to
interact with those they would normally not and disrupting the social rules of the everyday.48 In
his work, “The Sociology of Crises: The Louisville Flood of 1937,” Kutak describes an instance
in which an unidentified white church at first refused to allow African Americans entrance until
moved by the pitiful sight of the refugees on the street:
the members of the congregation looked out of the church windows and saw a group of
Negroes standing in the street awaiting transportation elsewhere, their hearts were
softened and they invited them in. Soon about two hundred Negroes of both sexes and all
ages had made themselves at home in the church auditorium. Ample food supplies were
secured and cooked in the church kitchen. The Negro tenants of the church were most
grateful to their white benefactors, and thanked them publicly in their nightly prayer
service. A pleasant and cordial atmosphere prevailed in the church and the transition to a
communal manner of living was made easily and happily.49
Kutak argues that this anecdote illustrates how the flood interrupted social life, and produced a
“holiday spirit” among citizens, resulting in the “breakdown of inhibitions and loosening of
social mores.” This in turn allowed for freer social interactions than typical of the organized
urban society.50 When finally allowed to stay, the African American group was expected to be
grateful to their “white benefactors” and praise them for allowing them to share their shelter
during a crisis in which loss of life and disease were realistic possibilities. The story reinforces

Standridge 15
the supposed power and progressivism of the white group and African Americans’ forced
acceptance of their lower status. African Americans were expected not only to accept the idea
that the white group had the power to turn them away, but were also compelled to praise the
white group for allowing them to stay at all.
While this particular example provides insight into a single unnamed relief station, relief
and rescue efforts during the flood were ever-changing and administered by a patchwork of
government and private organizations. Other accounts from African Americans provide
additional insight into individuals’ experiences that corroborate Kutak’s assertion and mirror the
racial circumstances within the story. For refugees of both races, some stations presented fairly
comfortable accommodations while others were crowded and at times lacking in supplies. One
witness’s testimony described a relief station at 6th and St. Catherine Streets in sordid terms. The
school building was filled with “several hundred white and colored people” who were mostly of
the “lowest economic class.” 51 The witness painted a graphic and grim picture:
You opened the door to go in, such a foul odor greeted you that it took added
determination to go any farther. So many people were gathered in the halls that the
building seemed unusually dark and one had to be very careful not to step on some one. It
was the same way upstairs- all over the building- crowded, filthy rooms and dirty
people… the place was a living hell. The dirt, disorder, and congestion was beyond
description. It was life at its worse. The only cheerful place was the school lunch room in
which the food was prepared 52
Other locations such as at the Emmett Field School in Crescent Hill which predominantly housed
African Americans during the natural disaster were more fair and orderly. One refugee recalled
that the center developed its own daily routine complete with two meals a day and evening
religious programs led by assistants from the Baptist Seminary.53 The station even developed a
system of creating meal tickets from an office stamp that ensured that no one was eating more
than their fair share.
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These examples represent two ends of the spectrum of conditions, illustrating the
variation and disorder within relief efforts. Yet, the latter group did encounter one hitch; the
question of whether or not they would be allowed to stay at the school at all. The letter states:
Our group found itself at the Emmett Field School in Crescent Hill, one of the exclusive
residential sections of the city. There was some question at first as to whether we would
be permitted to stay, but after a few days the neighbors not only endorsed our presence
but urged it, lest we be replaced by undesirable whites. 54
The writer’s recollection of events reveals the tenuous position of the African American group;
their stay as refugees at the school hinged on the approval of the neighborhood’s white residents.
Their experience mirrored the circumstance seen in Kutak’s writing, although the rationale the
witness provides behind the white neighbors’ decision is not empathy, but pragmatism.
Moreover, the two recollections also hint at the possible influence of social class and
respectability during the flood, as the first station is described as composed of predominantly
lower-class people, while the second station is presumably of high enough social stature to be
more desirable than lower class whites.
The segregationist sentiments and racial tension evident in these stories directly
influenced the administration of refugee stations, where blacks and whites were segregated
whether in the same location or in race-specific centers. One nurse affiliated with the city Health
Department was stationed at the Rubel Avenue School and described being ordered there and
finding “sixteen white people in a ten-room school,” completely lacking in supplies. 55 Shortly
later word was received that the school was be used for African Americans. Nurse Ruth Day
wrote
Within a short while telephone communication brought the information that our place
was to be used as a Colored Refugee Center. A short while before this a faithful doctor
had wandered into our midst. In conference with him I came to formulate a plan for an
organization which would take care of admitting, registering, immunizing, and
segregation of the coming refugees. Our real problem was the lack of cots, mattresses, or
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even blankets… Our need for blankets arrived about midnight, and about two hours later
the five hundred (500) colored refugees for whom we had planned began coming in…
Out of their flooded homes, out of the cold steady down pour of rain that would not
cease, quietly they filed into the admitting office where each one was registered and
given a card for typhoid injection, if needed, passing on into the medical unit,
(Superintendent’s Office) to receive the injection, on then to the assigned quarters as
directed by a white man on each floor. Men were quartered on the third floor, women on
the second, and mothers with small children on the first. 56
Another nurse who worked at the same refugee center wrote in her report that once the
African American group arrived, the smaller white group was evacuated and the school was
inhabited entirely by African Americans (not including the presence of relief staff). Nurses
stationed at Churchill Downs relayed similar patterns and stories. The racetrack originally
housed white refugees with African Americans who were “brought in and put in another part of
the building” until rising waters forced everyone together in a single large room on the second
floor of the clubhouse.57 In their new quarters “the negroes were roped off on one side and the
whites on the other” until finally the white refugees were evacuated and it became entirely an
African American center, while more black refugees continued to arrive.58
With the city overwhelmed with refugees, some Louisvillians were temporarily relocated
to unaffected cities throughout the state until the situation improved. A Courier-Journal article
entitled “Negroes Get Attention in Lexington” stated that before sending refugees to Lexington,
Mayor Miller asked “Mayor E. Reed Wilson how many Negro refugees the city could handle.”59
His response prompted the journey by train of 200 African American and 75 white Louisvillians
to the neighboring city. While the African American group was “cleared” through the Colored
Community Center where they were vaccinated for typhoid fever before being placed in African
American churches, the white group arrived the following day and was placed in private
homes.60
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In the rush to establish aid, there may have been some exceptions to the separation of
races, though ambiguity in some of the reporting of the times leaves open the question of extent
and duration. For example, on January 30, the Courier-Journal publicized the existence of five
soup kitchens in downtown Louisville: “two for whites, two for Negroes, and one mixed.”61 The
article includes the detail that one kitchen had served both races until limited to whites only on
January 29 when a separate kitchen for African Americans was opened nearby. Another article
dated January 23, stated that while race specific centers existed, African Americans would not be
refused meals at other locations. It is unclear how long this provision applied, if it was actually
practiced, or how either race would have reacted to it.62 In addition, an article published in the
Courier-Journal on January 29 states that “at least 3,000 Negroes and 1,500 white persons were
being housed in Highland homes” presenting the possibility that African Americans were housed
in or in near proximity to white homes.63 However, this figure is only mentioned in news
coverage once, and its accuracy is doubtful given the effort put into establishing separate
accommodations for black and white refugees.
Despite some fluidity at first in accommodations, separate facilities designated for black
and white Louisvillians in 1937 appeared to uphold the “separate but equal” ideal, yet underlying
racism in person-to-person interactions still persisted. In a submission to the Courier-Journal
one Louisville nurse wrote of her experiences serving a mixed group of about 1,300 refugees at
the Wood-Mosaic Company on Crittenden Drive. 64 She described the segregation of the center
and indicated that regardless of race everyone was alike in their misfortune. She wrote: “the
white people and Negroes alike were bedded down on the floor or on boards placed across low
lying trucks used for pushing stacks of veneer from place to place in the plant.”65 She described
her assignment to the African American section, relaying a story in which she was giving
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inoculations when she caught sight of a “tall lanky colored boy.” She asked him if he had had his
first or second dose, and the conversation proceeded:
He innocently answered, “No, um, this is my sixth.” “Your sixth!” I exclaimed. “Yas, um
ah’ duh been moved to five places an’ ah gits one evah’ time ah’se moved. Ah’m scert of
dat disease.” 66
The story was clearly meant to be humorous to readers of the Courier Journal. The nurse
described the African American man, whose age is unclear, in a racially derogatory dialect and
portraying him as ignorant and unable to care for himself. Her description went on to detail
afternoon gatherings in which “the strains of Negro spirituals as only the darkies can sing them”
were heard. Despite the supposedly equal circumstances between the two refugee centers,
African Americans were still described as racial stereotypes and their behavior viewed as
strange, and “other.”
Eyewitness testimony confirmed the nearly uninterrupted continuation of segregation. As
seen from the reports of Health Department nurses, race specific centers were designated as soon
as conditions allowed. It is difficult to determine how these race specific centers measured up to
one another. When forced to use the same building under the direst of conditions, the races
accepted divided spaces, as at Churchill Downs and the Wood-Mosaic Company.
In addition, “polite racism” persisted. Two African American groups, for example, faced
either the possibility of being refused entry or forced out of safe locations because of their race.
When finally allowed to stay, as in Kutak’s story, the African American group was expected to
be grateful to their “white benefactors” and praise them for allowing them to share their shelter
during a crisis in which loss of life and disease were realistic possibilities. The story reinforced
the supposed power and progressivism of the white group and African Americans’ subservient
status as they were expected not only to accept the idea that the white group had the power to
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turn them away, but also were compelled to praise the white group for allowing them to stay at
all.
Despite evidence of both segregation and racially prejudiced attitudes, some African
American eyewitnesses asserted at the time and in retrospect that the flood disaster was free of
racism, and commended relief authorities such as the municipal government and the Red Cross
for their actions. In a letter dated January 28, 1937, Mrs. Alice Kean wrote to her son Daniel
Garner Kean, who was pursuing a degree in Michigan, about the family’s experiences during the
flood:
It is impossible for me to draw a picture, but Red Cross and the outside world came and
worked hard and here done all in their power for relief of all. C.H. was head of the
Housing Committee on Colored and sister + Bill were some of the workers.67
Kean describes relief efforts in positive terms and commends the Red Cross specifically. “C.H.”
is mentioned in several letters throughout the Kean family papers and can be identified as
Charles H. Parrish Jr., a close family friend of the family. Although municipal records do not
contain any mention of a committee concerned with housing African Americans during the
flood, the committee may have been community or church based. While Kean praises the Red
Cross, others extolled Mayor Miller for his actions. In a letter addressed to Mayor Neville Miller
from the Alumni Chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, the African American organization
commended him for
his excellent management of the entire situation, and especially your treatment of the
colored sufferers. You have truly inaugurated a New Deal in interracial relations, not
only for Louisville, but for the entire nation. We are proud to live in a city that has you
for its mayor.68
Both Kean and the Alpha Psi Fraternity wrote at the time of the flood lauding specific
individuals for their actions during the crisis, while others conveyed similar positive sentiments
without naming any particular individual.
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In a letter to the editor published in the Courier-Journal, notable African American
historian and intellectual H.C. Weeden praised the entire “class of white people” in Louisville.69
Weeden begins by establishing his position as a longtime citizen of the city and stating his
knowledge of the “good association and cooperation that white people have given to the colored
people in this city, [sic] how they have taken part in such affairs to advance their interests
socially, morally and religiously.”70 Weeden continues by congratulating and thanking the white
people of the city on behalf of all African Americans. He states:
I want to say with pleasure and delight and I congratulate the white people for the
unlimited interest shown my people in this last great calamity, the flood, which
overshadowed our city, and the way in which our people were removed to places of
safety. How they visited our homes and got them in boats through the water.
I do not think there is any city outside of Louisville whose class of white people will
equal or surpass those of our city and I am quite sure that I can speak in behalf of all of
the colored people in the city when I say that we are grateful for all the efforts made in
our behalf, in this time of trouble.71
Weeden’s comments very clearly reflects the state of race relations as described by George C.
Wright, as Weeden cites past enfranchisement and asserts Louisville’s superiority in race
relations as compared to other cities.
Four decades later in an oral history interview, Oma and Dathon Jones described their
experiences living in the Parkland neighborhood through the flood as relatively free of racial
prejudice. When questioned about the flood Oma Jones simply stated, “They forgot who was
white and who was black during the flood.”72 Who “they” were is not entirely clear- perhaps
relief officials, or Louisvillians more generally. Dathon Jones went on to describe his work for
the Works Progress Administration during and immediately after the flood which he initially
described as “fairly integrated.”73 Yet when questioned further, he revealed that common
workers were integrated, but supervising jobs remained entirely occupied by white men, with the
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exception of one black man who “just checked out the tools to you, and he was bodyguard for
the main foreman.”74 This shows that the reality of both the flood and race relations in Louisville
is more nuanced and complex than it often appears on the surface.
Flood Coverage in African American Newspapers: Debating Louisville’s Response
Newspapers often form the “first draft of history” and shape the collective memory of
events as they unfold.75 In 1937, print newspapers were at their height. In Louisville, there were
five primary newspapers: two white, three African American. The two white newspapers, the
Courier-Journal and the Louisville Times, were both acquired by the Bingham family in 1918.
The three African American newspapers were the Louisville Leader (1917-1950) owned and
edited by I. Willis Cole, the Louisville Defender (1933-present) owned and edited by Frank
Stanley Sr., and the Louisville News (1912-1947) edited by William Warley and Lee L. Brown.
During the 1937 flood, lack of power and flooded facilities made publishing local newspapers
nearly impossible. The Courier-Journal and Louisville Times managed to put out joint flood
editions with the aid of the Lexington Leader’s presses.76 The Louisville Leader however lacked
the connections of these larger companies and was unable to publish for three weeks during the
flood; similar challenges likely also caused the Louisville News to suspend publication.77 The
Louisville Defender on the other hand was in a more advantageous position as a subsidiary of the
larger nationally recognized weekly paper The Chicago Defender, which ultimately allowed the
paper to publish throughout the disaster as their local competition’s presses sat idle.
Unfortunately, few issues of the black newspapers that existed in 1937 survive today. The entire
run of the Louisville News is lost, and only a single issue of the Louisville Leader for the year
1937 survives. A full run of the Louisville Defender survives from the year 1951 onward with
only a handful of other issues from 1933 available. The sources are scattered and incomplete, but
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in conjunction with other regional African American publications, the state of the black press
surrounding the flood can be pieced together.
African American newspapers around the country initially published an appalling picture
of the treatment of African Americans, focusing on Louisville in particular. On January 29, The
Plaindealer (Topeka Edition), an African American newspaper from Kansas, published a
scathing article, which was then reprinted in several other papers, declaring the situation in
Louisville “deplorable,” and asserting that many African Americans had died of disease or “want
of escape from waters,” and that a system of racial discrimination ruled the flood zone. 78 The
article slashed at the assurances provided by relief agencies that no racial discrimination was
present in the relief efforts.
Cots have been furnished by the American Red Cross although Red Cross officials say
there will be no discrimination in the flood area, it is a known fact that those in charge
here are drawing the color bar. They are giving the best of everything to the whites.79
The article also accused radio patrol boats manned by police officers and volunteers of refusing
to pick up African Americans while also alleging that those who did rescue African Americans
were subsequently dismissed from duty. This grim picture circulated in several newspapers,
including the Chicago Defender (National Edition) which published an almost identical article
the following day under the gripping front page headline, “Race Hit Hard as Flood Brings
Disease, Death to Thousands.”80
A week later, as the water levels fell and flood conditions in Louisville began to improve,
the next Chicago Defender (National Edition) seemed no less grim. The paper stated that the
process of “digging out the dead” had begun and that while the official death toll was 250-300
persons, it actually numbered into the thousands.81 An editorial entitled “Black Man Faces Mad
Waters And Rank Jim Crowism in Flooded South” again took direct aim at Louisville, railing

Standridge 24
against discrimination and directly implicating Mayor Miller for requiring that race be
designated in calls for relief as it was “too difficult to take care of any other than white persons.”
82

Adding to the appalling image of the flood district was the revelation that the N.A.A.C.P. had

requested credentials from the American Red Cross to send a representative to investigate and
assist with relief given to African Americans in the flood zone.83
These stories understandably stirred anxiety and outrage among the African American
community nationally. In a radio broadcast over WHAS and NBC Rabbi Joseph Rauch, a
prominent Louisvillian and member of the Mayor’s flood committee, addressed inquiries from
African Americans outside of Louisville. Rauch spoke of the positive morale of the city, and
assured listeners that their family members were safe, while also directly confronting concerns
about the African American community. Rauch stated
On the Mayor’s committee the colored people have representation. No distinction of any
kind is being made between whites and blacks. We take into account only the needs and
the facilities at our disposal. These are administered impartially. The colored people
throughout the land should know that the work of salvage and rehabilitation in Louisville
is being carried out on a humanitarian basis and no other principle.84
Rauch’s comments were a direct attempt to assuage growing concerns about African Americans
that were circulating in the black press.
As the immediate danger of the flood passed and rebuilding began, stories of the flood
predictably began to fade from the frontpages, but what few stories were printed showed a
significant change in tone from the previous weeks of coverage. On February 13, the Chicago
Defender devoted considerable space to Evansville, Indiana, during the flood. The story
highlighted positive race relations in the city, complete with a photo captioned “No Color Line
Here.”85 In the same issue, an article centered on Reverend James L. White’s account of the
flood in Louisville as told to a group of friends including Mary McLeod Bethune in Chicago.

Standridge 25
Within the story, White defends the Red Cross, stating that they served without discrimination
and adds
I am a bit astonished at some of the charges I’ve heard against the white citizens of
Louisville practicing discrimination during the flood. If such conditions existed it
certainly was not apparent to those who were in charge of groups during the flood. We
received every courtesy and attention and were treated as victims not races… I am not
qualified to state how treated in other cities in Kentucky, conditions among our race were
but I can state in all sincerity- after being in Louisville only three months- that I’ve never
seen a more friendly spirit of co-operation manifested between the races at a time like
this than I have witnessed in Louisville.86
When questioned on “trouble calls” that dispatched police to the Pythian Temple, White
responded that he believed the cause of concern was lack of food and supplies for the African
American refugees housed there. Of this group White states
We, of course, have trouble-makers in our race, like all other races, and it was this group
that became unmanageable during the flood and shortly thereafter that caused the Red
Cross the city officials some inconvenience.87
It is unclear exactly what “inconvenience” White is referring to, although it may be a reference
to general discontent or the threat of rioting by refugees. The possibility of rioting was certainly
on relief officials’ minds. There is at least one recorded incident in which a white relief worker
was hurriedly sent to an African American refugee station housing six hundred people to quell
the “imminent” threat of rioting only to find the situation peaceful and in good order.88
Although the situation is unclear, White’s account notably shifts the onus of unfairness from
relief workers to a select few “troublemakers.”
By February 20, what few flood stories were published continued to subtly back away
from the storylines that had originally been published in the midst of the flood’s initial chaos.
The Kentucky state news section of the Chicago Defender written by Lee L. Brown (editor of the
Louisville News) and located in the final pages of the newspaper, culminated with the statement:
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There has been very little discrimination if any showed by the units conducting relief
work in regards to our group. A number of reports circulated by communists to the press
are untrue.89
Here is perhaps the closest thing to an admission that inaccuracies have been published by the
press. While Brown attributes the responsibilities for any mistruths to the most obvious and
persistent “other” of the American consciousness since the first World War – communists. As
soon as the Louisville Leader resumed publication in mid-March, I. Willis Cole lost no time in
implicating who was really to blame for publishing inaccuracies. Although the only issue of the
Leader that survives for the entire year 1937 comes from December, Cole’s efforts were
commended by Floyd J. Calvin in his widely-reprinted column “Calvin’s Digest.” In his writing,
Calvin noted the differences in captions that accompanied picture of an African American chain
gang in Mississippi that was made to work under slave conditions sandbagging during the flood.
His article focuses on the racist comments made by white newspapers toward the African
American prisoners forced to aid in flood relief and what he saw as African Americans’
unwillingness to give credit to white relief workers. He wrote
in spite of these untoward incidents, out of the scourge of the flood there came this: the
unmistakable attempt, on the part of relief officials to give succor without discrimination.
We note with appreciation that the editor of the Louisville Leader has seen fit to take to
task a fellow editor for carrying stories to the effect that discrimination was rampant in
stricken Louisville, when, as a matter of fact as this eye witness asserts, relief officials are
deserving of high praise. Perhaps by the time the next flood comes along, the etiquette of
levee defense will have improved where those who save a city whether prisoners or no,
will be presented to the public only as heroes.90
Calvin indicated that prejudice and narrowmindedness was present in both white and black
newspapers. He admonished the white press for their tasteless, anti-black comments on the
African American chain gang, and the black press for publishing inaccuracies and being
unwilling to recognize that white relief officials served fairly.
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Despite a yearlong gap in the historical record, a surviving issue of the Leader published
over a year later in April 1938 provides more insight into Cole’s criticism and identifies the
particular newspaper he addressed. This article references back to past inaccuracies in the
Chicago Defender, saying:
The World’s Greatest Weekly, which syndicates a Louisville edition from its Chicago
plant is wrong again. It was during the flood of 1937 that the paper was so far wrong and
made so many ridiculous statements about the disaster as it involved the relationship
between the two races in Louisville.91
Why did Cole feel the need to point out these inaccuracies more than a year later? It is fairly
reasonable to surmise from both the Calvin’s Digest article and the stories by Cole published in
the Louisville Leader that he believed the situation in Louisville to have been much more
congenial and fair than the out of town papers had represented it to be. But even so this begs the
question: in criticizing the Defender was he trying to uphold journalistic principles of truth and
investigation? Or was it more complicated? Cole could simply have been taking an easy hit at his
competition – discrediting the Defender would certainly boost his own business, or perhaps he,
like many other Louisvillians was sensitive to the idea of someone outside the city criticizing
local race relations.
Perhaps this sensitivity was for good reason. Afterall, the disparity in assessments of race
during the flood was almost entirely geographic; sources in Louisville highlighted the congenial
racial atmosphere, while newspapers in Chicago and the Midwest painted the situation as utter
disaster. This discrepancy even extends to “The American Way” photograph. Margaret BourkeWhite was not a Louisville native, and flew in on assignment from LIFE as soon as the severity
of the disaster was clear. Although the image may be the most famous to emerge from the flood,
to regard it as emblematic of the event would be an oversimplification. Photojournalism though
intended to be as impartial as possible, is never entirely so; the photographer exercises control in
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choosing the subject and composing the shot. But, here again was an outsider drawing attention
to the unequal treatment of African Americans during the crisis. The crux of the issue is
assessing to what degree the incongruity in coverage results from journalistic error due to
distance or Louisville’s city-pride and unwillingness to admit shortcomings.
Despite the devastation of the flood Louisvillians felt hopeful that the rebuilding would
bring improvements to the city’s infrastructure and their own lives. Amidst the rhetoric of
improving the city to build a greater Louisville, black Louisvillians may have felt hopeful for the
future, and reasoned that dwelling on injustices during the flood when the event as a whole had
upheld the separate but equal standard on the most basic levels was fruitless and even potentially
detrimental to the unified atmosphere of the city. Moreover, black community leaders expressed
the notion that the destruction of the flood had presented the city with the rare opportunity for
widespread, drastic improvement of substandard African American housing that would not have
been feasible otherwise.92 Yet, others, such as African American community leader Roy Wilkins,
saw the rebuilding effort as administered by the local government and organizations such as the
Red Cross, as acquiescing to local racial customs and missing the opportunity to improve
conditions for black Louisvillians.93
Still, only months later some improvements appeared to be materializing. Although the
track had been partially underwater and acting as a refugee station only months before, the city
recovered enough for the running of the Derby in May. The same week of the Derby, the
Mayor’s office reported that all public services had been restored to pre-flood standards or
improved.94 In addition, the blighted and high flood risk neighborhood of the Point was
depopulated and replaced with public parks and recreational areas.95 Yet black Louisvillians
were unable to benefit from these new leisure spaces because public parks in Louisville remained
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segregated until 1957.96 In the years following the flood, public housing developments emerged,
presenting improved living spaces and amenities. Yet, like public parks, these public housing
units remained stringently segregated for decades thereafter. In the private housing market, white
residents chose not to rebuild in the low-lying West End and instead fled to the suburbs to the
east and south of the city. African Americans in turn moved into the West End. While this was
an improvement from the crowded, substandard conditions of downtown where many African
Americans had resided previously, it came as a result of whites deeming the land undesirable for
themselves and claiming other areas, thereby assigning this portion of the city to African
Americans.97
Conclusion
Examining the experience of black Louisvillians during the flood is difficult as white
perspectives have shaped the popular memory of the event and are far better represented in the
historical record. At a minimum, considering the limited perspective of the flood available in
conjunction with the legal and customary discrimination of the era is enough to cast serious
doubts as to whether the veneer of positivity and unity is accurate.
While white newspapers published stories highlighting unity and cooperative race
relations, Louisville’s black press largely lacked the resources to publish. With the mouthpiece
of the black community silent, there was no voice in Louisville loud enough to challenge that of
the white press, which very selectively chose what images and stories to print and facilitated the
creation of the dominant memory. Stories exclusively regarding the black community’s gratitude
toward white Louisvillians, and derogatory, racialized anecdotes and images of African
Americans appeared on the pages of the white media, while little attention was given to the city’s
tremendous efforts to remain racially segregated throughout the flood. The publication of some
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stories and exclusion of others demonstrates Louisville’s self-conscious atmosphere of race
relations in which whites remained at the top, and African Americans on the bottom, while this
inequality remained a consistently unspoken rule. With much of the population displaced, the
invisible boundaries of the city that existed before the flood and persisted thereafter may have
temporarily fluctuated to allow escape from water, but the unspoken social boundaries between
white and black largely did not. Louisvillians were segregated in race specific centers as soon as
possible, and when not possible, kept separated within the same facility until conditions
improved enough to relocate one race.
Despite stories of social equalization, whites always maintained control, as demonstrated
by their ability to refuse African American groups shelter (even if unexercised) and the unequal
power dynamic in which black citizens felt it necessary to specifically commend and thank
whites for considering them in a time of crisis. In fact, by holding the power to displace black
refugees, but ultimately choosing not to exercise it, white Louisvillians would have been
demonstrating their supposed progressivism as compared to other southern cities while
enfranchising African Americans in the most limited, paternalistic sense possible.
In popular thinking, the waters of the river were indiscriminate, affecting all social
groups and races equally, regardless of existing inequalities, rendering all equal during the flood.
This collective memory persists to the present and is evident within the most comprehensive
book on the flood in Louisville, The Great Flood of 1937: Rising Waters, Soaring Spirits, in
which the author repeats this idealistic narrative. By asserting the false notion that all social
distinctions disappeared during the natural disaster, scholars have been lulled into thinking that
serious research into the particular experiences of minority groups is unnecessary. This is
perhaps a partial explanation as to why very few oral history interviews with African Americans
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on the subject of the flood exist despite many interviews with white citizens. If the predominant
narrative is of a racially progressive city during the flood, then actively seeking out interviewees
of varied race and background to interview would seem unnecessary.
As one of the most iconic events of Louisville’s history, the flood has left a permanent
mark on the physical landscape and cultural atmosphere of the city. The natural disaster has its
own distinct collective memory characterized by the values and biases of the city. This narrative
has been knit so tightly to the historical facts of the event, that the two have been confounded
and rendered indistinguishable even in academic analyses. Uncovering the historical reality of
the flood is difficult, if not impossible as African American eyewitness testimony is so scarce,
and newspaper records incomplete, but what emerges from existing sources is a more complex
picture than city fathers wished to put forward. The complexities of race relations during the
flood have the potential to run counter to the prevailing collective memory, requiring not only
critical scholarship, but also willingness to renegotiate Louisville’s own self-image. The
dominant narrative that the flood united the city first in the face of mutual adversity, and again
during rebuilding when citizens hoped to make Louisville better than before, at a minimum
erases the experiences of African Americans in the city, while also failing to account for the
worsening residential and social segregation of the decades following in which the city became
bisected along the Ninth Street divide.
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